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Highlights
 – Due to the significant role already played by gas-fired power plants and the on-
going integration of renewables into the existing network, the relationship be-
tween the gas and electricity markets is becoming ever closer. As a result, we 
must consider if the existing gas and electricity market designs can cope with 
these changes or whether some market redesign is required in gas, electricity or 
both.
 – The decision to invest and trade is dependent on existing market designs, par-
ticularly concerning trade timeframes and geographical zones. A design which is 
too weak may create the possibility of cross-subsidies between time or space flex-
ible users and inflexible ones within each of the gas or electricity market design 
and between them.
 – With an increasingly close relationship between gas and electricity market de-
signs, the role of the TSOs may have to evolve. If transmission networks are fac-
ing a higher industry-specific or cross-industry demand for flexibility, increased 
coordination between operation and planning may be required from both gas 
TSOs and electricity TSOs.
 – Whether the current electricity generation is adequate depends increasingly on 
the current conditions of access to natural gas. If gas is to play such a signifi-
cant role in the security of electricity supply, compatibility between long-term 
arrangements in gas and in electricity markets must be ensured.
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Background
The interaction between gas and electricity markets is not a 
new phenomenon. Gas and electricity can be competitors, for 
instance, when a consumer is to install a boiler; but gas can also 
be an input for gas-fired power plants (GFPPs) to generate elec-
tricity as long as the spark spread is high enough (See Figure 1).
This interaction becomes, however, increasingly significant 
in a context of large-scale development of variable renewable 
energy sources (RES). GFPPs indeed appear as the technology 
that is most likely to provide the flexibility needed to cope with 
the technical challenges introduced by variable RES in power 
systems.1 
Gas and electricity have very different physical properties. 
Gas flows more slowly than electricity, and is also much less ex-
pensive to store. Moreover, gas systems feature inherent flexibil-
ity thanks to linepack storage. The balancing in gas systems is 
therefore less challenging than in power systems. Consequently, 
the way markets have been defined in both industries is very 
different. It is still considered by many today that the two indus-
tries should be addressed independently.
However, if the demand for flexibility in electricity markets is to 
be met by flexibility in the gas markets, coordination between 
gas markets and electricity markets will be needed both in the 
short-term and in the long-term. In the short-term, the choice 
of consuming gas to generate electricity, for instance, in case of 
1  For more details, see IEA(2012): The Impact of Wind Power on European Natural Gas Markets.
imbalances in the electricity market, will be made depending on 
the corresponding opportunity-costs and technical constraints. 
In the long-term, electricity transmission investments can for 
instance be a substitute for gas pipelines, which then strongly 
impacts the location of power plants and gas storage assets.
Short-term interactions between gas and 
electricity markets
Issue 1: Is harmonisation between the gas and electricity indus-
tries required or do the existing market differences simply reflect 
different technical realities? 
Most of the flexibility provided by gas markets is not priced to 
the gas network users who then do not perceive the flexibility 
costs. Some might argue that GFPPs are simply another con-
sumer of gas and that their needs will be met naturally. This im-
plies that the gas system always responds to the new needs born 
inside the electricity system. However, the markets taking place 
in gas and electricity are not based on the same set of rules. The 
time and place of delivery matter for a gas consumer or an elec-
tricity consumer, and the way time frames and geographical 
zones are defined will therefore impact the behaviour of these 
players. Price-signals associated with this flexibility depend in 
turn on the definitions of those zones. 
In the European Union (EU), simplifications have been intro-
duced with the aim to enhance competition and market inte-
gration: intra-zone constraints are not fully considered while 
inter-zone constraints are taken into account with imprecise 
Figure 1: Market integration of gas, heat, and electricity (source: Energinet)
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proxies. These simplifications result in misguided behaviour 
and hence efficiency loss. In addition, the zones are defined fol-
lowing political realities that often do not match physical re-
alities. Decisions to invest and trade are taken based on these 
sets of institutionally-established zones. Distortions could oc-
cur within the gas sector and the electricity sector but also in-
between both industries. 
Issue 2: Will the current market frameworks allow trading in a 
flexible way? Does a new context require a new market design? 
Should balancing responsibility be increasingly transferred from 
TSOs to participants?  
As most of the existing schemes were designed to handle large 
and stable flows of gas and electricity, they might be challenged 
in a more volatile environment. The simplifications put into 
place by market designers do inevitably determine the busi-
ness-models for flexible generation assets, storage assets, and 
transmission assets. Relying on simplifications leads to cross-
subsidies between flexible users and inflexible ones inside each 
industry and across them. In any simplification of a market, 
there is a trade-off. One option is to expose all participants 
to each category of costs that they generate and to reduce the 
socialisation created by the improper definition of trade time-
frames and market zones. From the viewpoint of the gas mar-
ket, decreased socialising comes with the possibility for users 
to reveal their preferences on flexibility. Another option is the 
exact opposite, which is to enlarge or simplify trade horizons 
and market zones. This calls for an easing of access to flexibility 
within the energy system(s) and to socialising the costs created 
by longer timeframes and larger zones. 
In certain gas market design, the short-term market (as within-
day) does not exist yet. This “missing market” is key in under-
standing the short-term interaction challenges between gas and 
electricity.
Long-term interactions between gas and 
electricity markets
a) Coordination of investments
Issue 3: Is the current level of coordination between gas and elec-
tricity TSOs sufficient to ensure delivery of the needed invest-
ments? 
Assets involved in the transmission of gas and power, as well as 
generation assets, feature high capital costs and long life expec-
tancy, and they require long planning delays and long construc-
tion times before operating. Investment decisions are therefore 
strongly affected by uncertainty regarding the future environ-
ment. In particular, the profits generated by an asset are im-
pacted by the investment decisions taken by other players, both 
within the same industry and in the other industry. Figure 2 
illustrates the case of two competing investments that are mutu-
ally exclusive. 
Transmission assets owners in Europe are regulated; their re-
muneration depends on the approval of a national regulatory 
authority. The planning of investments is then decided at a na-
tional level, generally proposed by the TSO and approved by a 
national authority. As the relationship between the power sector 
and the gas sector becomes increasingly significant, the coordi-
Figure 2: Illustration of mutually exclusive investments 
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nation level between Transmission System Operators (TSOs) 
in the gas and electricity sector should increase as well.
Issue 4: How are the distortions between price-signals received in 
the gas and the power sector impacting the investment decisions 
made by participants? 
Distortions in short-term price-signals affect long-term deci-
sions taken by the participants. If the network system flexibility 
can be used for free, network users will not have enough in-
centives to invest in other kinds of flexible assets. If the price-
signals received by participants in one of the industries do not 
reflect the real characteristics, misguided investment decisions 
will lead to inefficiency across both industries.
Issue 5: How to ensure that TSOs receive the adequate incentives 
to invest and efficiently operate these new assets? Can the old 
model adapt to this new role of the TSOs? Are there any competi-
tion issues regarding the operation of flexibility assets by TSOs?
The role of the TSOs will have to evolve if transmission assets 
are used to deliver a high amount of flexibility. Gas TSOs can 
for instance offer more line-pack capacity but this will reduce 
the available transportation capacity; electricity TSOs might 
have to invest in storage capacities (as it is already the case in 
Italy) or in demand response. It is not clear today how TSOs 
will deal with conflicting incentives between the need of an 
efficient operation of the network and the existing regulatory 
frame governing the ownership of various assets able to deliver 
flexibility. 
b) Long-term contracts and security of supply
Issue 6: How can compatibility of long-term security of supply 
in the power and in the gas systems be ensured, for instance, at 
times of difficulties in both?  Should gas arrangements be driven 
by power system reliability? 
Gas can play a significant role in long-term security of sup-
ply of electricity. As gas is cheaper to store than electricity, the 
amount of energy stored in gas storages is much higher than 
the amount of energy stored in electricity storage (see Figure 
3). Similarly, energy can be transferred between two countries 
through cross-border gas transmission or electricity transmis-
sion. 
However, there might be some tensions in case of difficulties 
in gas or electricity or both. What would the status of GFPP 
electricity producers then be compared to the other gas con-
sumers: should the gas flow to generate electricity or for more 
specific gas uses? What if long-term contracts to supply GFPPs 
are disturbed due to political choices restraining the use of gas? 
Figure 3: Energy Storage capacities in Europe (source: Energinet)
Issue 7: Will new kinds of gas supply contracts emerge when need-
ed or are there any barriers to their development? Does the lack of 
adequate gas supply contracts constitute a barrier to entry in the 
generation sector?
Gas supply contracts may have many dimensions, such as firm 
versus interruptible, rigid versus flexible, short term versus long 
term, etc. An important issue is the need for gas contracts that 
are both long-term and flexible for GFPPs operating as back-
up units. The existing supply contracts have not been designed 
for flexible power production. However, flexible contracts may 
allow consuming a maximum amount of energy per year with-
out any constraint on the consumption pattern.
Moreover, it is worth underlining that the incompatibility be-
tween gas and electricity usages and arrangements may appear 
with transmission contracts. While cross-border gas supply is 
based on long-term network contracting, power markets do 
not allow long-term reservation of capacity. In case of cross-
border paths, both the gas and the electricity interconnections 
should be explicitly taken into account in long-term contracts 
and left to short-term implicit allocation.
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